When Systems Exceed Capacity: Authority, Judgment, and Institutional Behavior Under Constraint
This working paper examines how institutional decision-making changes under conditions of sustained constraint. Drawing on governance theory and operational experience, it proposes that systems may substitute authority for judgment when capacity limits are exceeded.
The paper explores the structural mechanisms behind this shift and its consequences for decision-making, system performance, and perceived legitimacy. It also considers how governance systems can be designed to preserve adaptive capacity and maintain effectiveness under pressure.
Keywords
Governance, Institutional Design, Decision-Making, Capacity Constraints, Systems, Authority, Accountability, Judgment, Public Administration, Capacity, Complexity, Legitimacy
This paper is part of:
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